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Priority Conflicts as a Barrier to
Cooperation in Multinational Insolvencies
Jay Lawrence Westbrook*
Although we have made remarkable progress in the last decade in
the management of multinational insolvencies, the fundamental anomaly
remains: a global economic crisis must be managed by various national
courts. Our judges must act like a team of surgeons, each of whom is
able to treat only one part of the patient. This article discusses one of the
most important difficulties that arise from that awkward system.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PRIORITIES
Although insolvency systems around the world share fundamental
premises and purposes, there are many variations which present
substantial obstacles to cooperation among courts in the insolvencies of
multinational corporations. Among the most important of these
differences are varying rules governing priorities (preferences) among
creditors in the distribution of the value realized in insolvency
proceedings, whether liquidation or reorganization. From a broad policy
perspective, the differences are not crucial, yet each one represents a
contentious result in a particular case because one party or another will
be advantaged or disadvantaged. Meaningful cooperation among courts
will often require that one or the other priority system prevails. The
question is whether a court will feel so bound by the local system so as to
prevent cooperation with a foreign court.
This problem did not appear in the old-style territorialist approach
to international insolvency. Each court grabbed the assets it could reach
and distributed them according to local priority rules. Only when courts
try to cooperate to maximize value and fairness in a multinational case
does the problem of differing priorities arise. In recent years we have
seen the general acceptance of "modified universalism"-a pragmatic,
accommodating form of the universalist approach to insolvency that
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seeks to promote cooperation between courts and to produce results as
near as possible to the ideal of a single, global proceeding.1  This
approach also permits a meaningful chance for a global reorganization of
a business, thus avoiding the serious loss of value almost always
associated with piecemeal liquidation. Yet the clash of priority systems
presents a serious obstacle to the universalist project.2
The differences in priority rules are numerous.3 In some countries,
for example, secured parties enjoy an absolute priority in the proceeds of
their collateral, while in others certain creditors may come ahead of the
secured party in the distribution of those proceeds. In the latter
jurisdictions, those who trump the secured party will vary from the tax
collector to the insolvency administrator to the general unsecured
creditors. Many countries give their own taxes a special lien or general
priority while refusing to distribute anything on account of another
country's taxes. Virtually all systems give a priority to moneys owed to
workers, but the entitlements protected and the nature and amount of
employee preferences vary greatly.4  These three types of parties-
secured parties, tax authorities, and employees-are favored in most
systems, but in differing ways and to differing degrees.
These and other differences create a number of difficulties. The
obvious one is distribution of proceeds. For example, if a division of a
company is sold as a whole, including assets and operations in several
countries, how shall the proceeds be allocated and distributed? But the
problem goes beyond allocation in distributions. It extends to decisions
about the management of the insolvency case. For example, suppose that
a higher price can be obtained for the division as a whole, but one of the
countries involved could realize more for its priority claimants by
separately selling the assets in that country. Does that country's court
have the power to cooperate in the maximization of value even if it
results in a somewhat lower distribution for the creditors favored by local
priorities? Note that nowadays the effect of applying local priority rules
1. See HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins. Ltd., [2008] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 852, 1 6,
available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldjudgmt.htm [hereinafter
HIH]. The case is also known as "McGrath v. Riddell."
2. It should be noted that even the holdouts for territorialism in the academy admit
that cooperation is important and cooperation of any kind leads quickly to the kinds of
issues discussed in this paper. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality
in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2216, 2218-20 (2000).
3. See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Participation in
Transnational Bankruptcies, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROY
GOODE 419 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priorities,
33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 27 (1998).
4. See generally Janis Sarra, An Investigation into Employee Wage and Pension
Claims in Insolvency Proceedings Across Multiple Jurisdictions: Preliminary
Observations, 16 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 835 (2007).
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will often not be a choice to benefit local creditors over foreigners. In
almost all countries, foreigners are given equal treatment and modem
communication means that many creditors, especially large multinational
creditors, will file in all relevant proceedings. Thus the choice is not
between local and foreign creditors but between local and foreign
priority systems. The conflicts exist in both liquidation and
reorganization cases, but are more subtle and more serious in the latter.
The priority issue is most highly focused when the question is
turnover of assets for administration and distribution by a foreign
administrator. Under the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, one
proceeding is designated as the "main" proceeding for a company.5 That
designation is given to the court in the country that is the center of main
interests of the insolvent business. Although the Model Law permits
secondary proceedings in each relevant jurisdiction,6 it also allows
turnover of assets to the main proceeding for distribution.7 Modified
universalism's goal is a single worldwide distribution, which would
suggest turnover of all assets to the primary court for distribution under
its rules or under some protocol agreed to by the relevant courts.
Assuming that a particular court is committed to advancing the
universalist goal, is it prevented from doing that because the foreign
court will distribute the proceeds in a way different from that
commanded by the local court's statutory priorities? Precisely that
question was recently presented to the House of Lords.
1I. THE HIH CASE
HIH, an Australian insurance company, entered insolvency
proceedings in Australia. It had substantial assets in the United
Kingdom, primarily in the form of reinsurance claims. A provisional
liquidation was opened in England and provisional liquidators appointed.
The Australian liquidation court sent a letter of request to the English
court asking that the English assets be released to the Australian
liquidators for distribution in that proceeding. The grant or denial of the
request would substantially impact the fortunes of various creditors
because of a difference in the priority rules of the two jurisdictions. The
5. G.A. 52/158, art. 2(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998), art. 2(b)
[hereinafter "Model Law"]. See generally IAN FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES (2005); CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW (Look Chan Ho
ed., 2006). The EU Regulation has a similar provision. See Council Regulation
1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EU).
6. Model Law, supra note 5, arts. 25-32.
7. Id. art. 21(l)(e).
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Australian rules gave a priority to claimants under insurance policies
over other creditors; the English rules did not.
8
The lower courts decided that they were bound by the English
priority rules and therefore could not release the assets to be distributed
under the Australian rules. The House of Lords disagreed. Although the
decision was unanimous, there was a sharp split as to the rationale for the
result. The wise reader will turn to English experts to understand the full
analysis of English law in the various judgments. For the international
observer, the key dispute was over the role of universalism in English
common law.
Three of the five members of the panel were content to decide that
the restraining effect of the English priority system was overcome by the
application of an unusual feature of English law, section 426 of the
Insolvency Act. 9 That section reflects a special reciprocity in insolvency
matters among a small group of jurisdictions, including Australia and
England. The panel majority held that section 426 permitted the turnover
of assets to the Australian proceeding notwithstanding the resulting
change in distributional results.
The judgment of Lord Hoffmann, with Lord Walker's concurrence,
took a very different approach. He found that universalism, in a
modified and pragmatic form, was "a golden thread" running through
English common law in matters of international insolvency. In his view,
universalism requires that the English court turn over assets in
cooperation with a foreign court as a general rule unless there is some
principle of justice or UK public policy that prevents the turnover. Here,
there was no such obstacle and thus turnover was required. The
application of section 426 was unnecessary.
Two of the remaining three members of the panel squarely
disagreed with Lord Hoffmann. Lord Scott and Lord Neuberger would
have refused turnover absent the special relationship with Australia
under section 426. Thus, it seems clear that these two panel members
would have declined to turn over the assets to an American trustee, for
example, while Lord Hoffmann and Lord Walker would ordinarily
permit turnover. 10 Lord Phillips took a third path, agreeing with the
result under section 426 and declining to reach the question of
8. HIH, [2008] UKHL 21, 51. By the time of the decision in the House of Lords
the English system had been altered to give a similar priority to insurance claimants.
While the change did not apply to the HIH case, the change naturally made it easier to
conclude that England had no great policy antagonism to the Australian system.
9. Insolvency Act, 1986, § 426(4)-(5) (Eng.).
10. The United States is not a section 426 nation. For the most part, , the insurance
industry in the United States is regulated at the state level. The state regulations
generally have priority rules similar to the Australian system. See United States v. Fabe,
508 U.S. 491, 494 (1993).
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universalism. If the same question involving a country that lacks the
benefit of section 426 were to come before this panel again, his would be
the decisive vote in the case. 1'
Lord Hoffmann pointed out that the rule favored by Lord Scott
would mean that turnover would rarely occur except in those few
countries where section 426 applies. The differences in detail among
priority systems would ensure that result. Lord Neuberger acknowledged
that result with some apparent regret.12 As noted above, such a rule as to
priority inevitably impacts other, larger decisions beyond turnover or
allocation of proceeds, including decisions about the scope and nature of
asset sales and the choice of liquidation versus reorganization. Thus, if
local priority systems prevent turnover, they likely prevent many other
forms of cooperation as well. For example, a refusal to apply a
moratorium on asset seizures to a certain type of creditor based on local
practices may doom a global effort at reorganization. For all these
reasons, the fact that in Lord Hoffman's thoughtful opinion two of five
judges found a form of modified universalism in English common law is
the strongest and most important support for that concept in any of the
modern cases.
III. THE DISMISSAL SOLUTION
Lord Scott's position in HIH rested ultimately on the mandatory
effect of English statutory rules in a pending "winding up" proceeding.
It is not clear what rules would apply had the foreign liquidators sought
possession of the assets through an appropriate civil action in the absence
of an English insolvency case. The advantage to acting without opening
an insolvency proceeding would be that the priority rules and other
statutory constraints in the English statute would presumably not come
into effect. Even if an English winding-up were pending, might it be
possible to reach the same result by moving to dismiss the English
proceeding on the ground of comity, while ordering the transfer of the
assets?
11. The European Regulation has no provision similar to section 426.
12. HIH, [2008] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 W.L.R. 852, 76.
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The idea that dismissal of the "secondary" proceeding' 3 solves the
technical problem of local rules constraining cooperation has taken root
in the United States. Since the adoption of section 304 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code in 1978,14 United States courts have become
used to the idea of two different sorts of insolvency cases for foreign
companies: a full proceeding and a special "ancillary" proceeding. The
full proceeding is of the same sort used for domestic companies. The
special "ancillary" proceeding is designed solely for cooperation with a
foreign proceeding by way of injunction against creditor action, turnover,
discovery, and the like. This special proceeding does not have rules for
claims processing, distribution of proceeds, and other systems
characteristic of a regular domestic insolvency case. A companion
provision, section 305, gives the courts the authority to dismiss a full
insolvency case in the best interests of creditors or in deference to a
foreign proceeding. Thus, an American bankruptcy court could resolve
the problem presented in HIH by dismissing the full United States
insolvency case with its constraining rules of priority and procedure,
eliminating any conflict between those rules and its discretion to release
United States assets to a foreign "main" proceeding.15
The replacement of section 304 with the new Chapter 15 points to
the same approach. Dismissal as a tool of cooperation following the
adoption of Chapter 15 is illustrated by In re Compahia De Alimentos
Fargo, S.A., 16 although that case did not involve a priority issue as
such.17  In that case an involuntary insolvency proceeding was
13. The idea of a full local insolvency case as a "secondary" proceeding permeates
the EU Regulation. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in
General Default: Chapter 15, The ALl Principles, and The EU Insolvency Regulation, 76
AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2002); IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 246 (1999); Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 489 (1996); Wolfgang Lueke, The New European
Law on International Insolvencies: A German Perspective, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 369, 395
(2001); Robert Wessels, European Union Regulation On Insolvency Proceedings, 20 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 24, 26 (2001). The Model Law also contemplates local full bankruptcy
proceedings, but does not call them "secondary."
14. Section 304 was the predecessor to Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code
governing cooperation with foreign insolvency proceedings. Chapter 15 essentially
adopts the Model Law.
15. See, e.g., In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce, Ltd., 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1988), aft'd, 115 B.R. 442 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d
31 (2d Cir. 1991) (following U.S. preference recovery, U.S. case dismissed and assets
transferred to Hong Kong proceeding).
16. 376 B.R. 427 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). See also In re Bd. of Dirs. of Multicanal
S.A., 314 BR. 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd on other grounds Argentinian
Recovery Co. LLC v. Bd. of Dirs. of Multicanal S.A., 331 B.R. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
17. No Chapter 15 case was filed in Fargo. For a case that did involve Chapter 15,
see In re Bd. of Dirs. of Telecom Argentina, S.A., 528 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008) (Chapter
15 case in which approval of reorganization not barred by differences in rules).
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commenced against an Argentinean company, Fargo, by certain of its
United States creditors despite the pendency of a reorganization
proceeding in Argentina. The creditors claimed the foreign proceeding
was being conducted unfairly if not corruptly. In particular, the
petitioning creditors were concerned that a major secured creditor in the
case had too much leverage because the Argentinean stay did not apply
to secured parties. Although there were few assets to administer in the
United States, they apparently hoped the United States moratorium
would apply to the secured party and thus level the playing field. The
bankruptcy court refused to fall in with this plan and dismissed the
United States case in deference to the Argentinean one, after finding that
Argentinean insolvency law was generally fair.
Aside from claims of corruption and complaints about procedure,
the petitioners drew the judge's attention to important differences
between the United States and Argentinean systems. For example,
Argentina does not provide for "equitable subordination" of claims, nor
does it grant broad discovery to unhappy creditors. The court was not
persuaded that these differences were fundamental enough to justify a
parallel proceeding in the United States. Note that these and other
differences in procedure might well have as much practical impact in a
multinational case as a difference in priority.
IV. OBSTACLES TO THE DISMISSAL SOLUTION
I do not know in which jurisdictions the dismissal solution can be
employed, but certainly in a number of countries the similar problem of
parallel civil litigation is resolved by the dismissal of the local action
where the law requires deference to the foreign one. In common law
countries, such a dismissal might be pursuant to the concept of forum
non conveniens or simple abstention. 18 In civil law countries, the fact
that the foreign action was filed first may give rise to a dismissal lis
pendens. Perhaps the same concepts should be available in the
bankruptcy context where the foreign proceeding deserves deference.
The main substantive difficulty is a sort of vested rights theory, a
notion that a creditor has a right to a certain distribution of those funds
that come under control of a given court.19 A related argument is that the
application of local law to the claims filed in each jurisdiction yields
18. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: COOPERATION
AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES 76-82 (2003) (Procedural Principle 23 and 24). See
generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION:
PRACTICE AND PLANNING 211-70 (5th ed. 2006); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 300-49 (3d ed. 2003).
19. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-
Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 709-13 (1999).
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more predictable results. This idea might have had some basis when
bankruptcy laws were oriented to the protection of local creditors, but
nowadays many creditors file in each local proceeding around the
world. 20 The amount to be distributed by a particular court in a territorial
system is a free-floating function of a) the assets of the debtor that
happen to be in its jurisdiction at the moment when those assets become
subject to the local moratorium or dispossession order and b) the number
and amount of the claims that may be filed in that court by both local and
international creditors. The amount to be distributed is therefore often
impossible to predict even at the start of the local case, much less at the
time credit was extended. Even secured creditors, unless they have a
mortgage on real property, are subject to the rapid movement of personal
property and its proceeds from one jurisdiction to another, a mobility that
may make a mockery of "situs" choice-of-law rules.
Therefore, it would seem that a notion of vested rights or creditor
reliance will often be implausible and impractical in the application of
distribution rules, while making cooperation impossible in many cases
for the reasons explained earlier. If we are to have a workable system of
international cooperation, we have to choose a single priority system for
distribution that reflects these realities. In most cases, the approach that
will produce the most predictable and generally fair result-although by
no means highly predictable or completely fair-will be to distribute
assets through the main proceeding or under its distribution rules. If we
become dissatisfied with the current approach to determining which
proceeding is the main one,21 then we should focus our efforts on
developing a better one, because there is no other solution that shows
promise.
It is hard to see how international creditors-banks, investment
funds, large international suppliers, and the like-could object to such an
approach. However, there is a legitimate concern about small, local
creditors, including employees and suppliers. These creditors cannot be
expected to be sophisticated in planning for insolvency risks or able to
protect themselves in distant proceedings. It is for that reason that we
should have a system of claims facilities in any jurisdiction where there
are a substantial number of such creditors. Such a facility, operating
through the courts or through a system of arbitration, could permit these
creditors to make and prove their claims at home and in their own
languages. If there are too few creditors to justify such a system in a
20. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2292 (2000).
21. That is the "center of main interests" test. See generally Case C-341/04, In re
Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813; In re Bear Steams High-Grade Structured
Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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given country, it would be sensible to pay them in full from local assets
before the assets are transferred to the main proceeding. Such a system
has been recommended by the American Law Institute's Transnational
22Insolvency Project.
There is a second group of claims that require special attention in
this context: tax and other public claims. The problem here is that many
insolvency laws refuse to enforce such claims in favor of foreign tax
authorities. It is probably essential to international cooperation to pay
such claims locally before transferring property to a main jurisdiction
that has such laws. Neither fairness nor public reaction could abide
permitting a foreign corporation to hoodwink local taxing authorities or
otherwise milk the local public purse and then whisk away the local
assets without payment of these public claims.
Finally, there is the question of claims in tort (delict). This sort of
claim has the potential to create concern about universalism, especially
in common law countries with rules relatively favorable to tort claimants.
The concern would be that these claimants would not receive fair
treatment in a primary jurisdiction where claims of that sort are not
favored.23  On the other hand, cases dealing with such claims have
managed to find acceptable compromises. The most notable example is
the Dow Coming (silicone implant) case in the United States. 24
Furthermore, it is important to note that no country offers a priority to
tort claimants generally, so the policymakers have not indicated a special
concern for those claimants. Whatever the proper solution, this area is
another one that may require some special rules once we have enough
litigation to better understand the issues presented.
V. CONCLUSION
Modified universalism has received a strong impetus from the
eloquent opinion of Lord Hoffman in HIH. It is one of several major
steps forward that we have taken in the effort to match the reach of
insolvency laws to the boundaries of a global market. Yet we have far to
go. An important obstacle to cooperation and the ultimate ideal of a
single, worldwide proceeding is the presence of so many varying rules
22. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION IN TRANSNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY CASES AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT Procedural Principle 22 (2003).
23. The pendency of tort claims in the United States and claims by another group of
sympathetic parties, pensioners, in the United Kingdom was a major factor hindering
cooperation in the Federal Mogul multinational bankruptcy.
24. See, e.g., Roberts v. Picture Butte Municipal Hospital, [1999] 4 W.W.R. 443
(A.Q.B.) (staying a Canadian tort action in deference to a global settlement in an United
States Chapter 11 proceeding).
2009]
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concerning the distribution of the values realized by insolvency
proceedings. The way forward in some jurisdictions may be found in the
dismissal solution combined with sensitivity to the special treatment that
may be appropriate for certain types of claims.
